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Abstract
We initiate the study of the natural multiplayer generalization of the classic continuous
Colonel Blotto game. The two-player Blotto game, introduced by Borel as a model of resource
competition across n simultaneous fronts, has been studied extensively for a century and seen
numerous applications throughout the social sciences. Our work defines the multiplayer Colonel
Blotto game and derives Nash equilibria for various settings of k (number of players) and n.
We also introduce a “Boolean” version of Blotto that becomes interesting in the multiplayer
setting. The main technical difficulty of our work, as in the two-player theoretical literature,
is the challenge of coupling various marginal distributions into a joint distribution satisfying a
strict sum constraint. In contrast to previous works in the continuous setting, we derive our
couplings algorithmically in the form of efficient sampling algorithms.
1 Introduction
The Colonel Blotto game has been featured in the game theory literature ever since it was introduced
by Borel in 1921 [10]. It has found numerous applications in the social sciences as a model of
competition with limited resources across simultaneous winner-take-all fronts.
The basic structure of the game is as follows. There are two players, Alice and Bob, competing
over n battlefields of value v1, . . . , vn (which may represent items, voting districts, advertising slots,
etc.). Alice and Bob each have finite budgets—BAlice,BBob—of a resource to distribute across the
battlefields. They must simultaneously decide how to allot their budgets of the resource across the
battlefields by placing a vector of n bids, one for each battlefield. The value of each battlefield is
won by the player that allocates more resources to it, or split evenly in the case of a tie. The players
have the goal of maximizing the total value of their winnings. It is common to restrict the game to
be symmetric—players have the same budget—and/or homogeneous—all battlefields have the same
value.
Though the game is simple to describe, there is considerable complexity in the equilibrium
strategies that emerge.1 Analysis of two-player Blotto has proved to be a challenging mathematical
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1It is well known that even the simplest Blotto games do not admit pure Nash equilibria. Consider the two-player
symmetric homogeneous Blotto game with n > 2 battlefields. If Alice fixes any bid vector ~a = (a1, . . . , an) (where a1 6= 0
without loss of generality), then Bob can maximize his winnings by picking the action ~b = (0, a2 + , a3 + , . . . , an + ),
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task, because randomized strategies for the game are complicated joint distributions over n-
dimensional vectors on a simplex. However, there has been substantial recent progress in finding
and classifying equilibria for several standard versions of the game [25, 38, 31, 22, 33, 36], many
of which are now essentially solved [23]. In most cases, equilibria for the Blotto game have been
developed based on solutions to the much simpler soft-budget constraint version of the game called
General Lotto. In a strategy for the Lotto game, each player bids a distribution for each battlefield,
rather than a single value, and the winner of the battlefield is computed by comparing single samples
from the distributions played by the two players. What makes Lotto easier to analyze is its budget
constraint, that the sum of the n sampled bids of each player i is at most Bi in expectation. In
contrast, the Blotto game requires a way to couple the n different bid distributions such that any
joint sample satisfies the budget constraint Bi with probability 1.
Modeling two-party elections is a famous application of the Blotto game [25, 31, 28]. Hoping
to understand multiparty electoral systems, Myerson alluded to a Blotto game with more than
two players in [30], which compares different types of multiparty election systems by studying the
equilibrium strategies those systems induce. In this context, the classic plurality vote elections
conducted in many parliamentary democracies such as India and the United Kingdom are natu-
rally modelled by a multiplayer generalization of Colonel Blotto with, e.g., the multiple parties
corresponding to players, voting districts corresponding to battlefields, and district advertising
expenditures corresponding to the resource allocations. However, stating that “the hardest part
of [the Blotto] problem was to construct joint distributions for allocations that always sum to the
given total,” Myerson weakened the true budget constraint to the soft one and only analyzed what
would nowadays be called multiplayer homogeneous symmetric General Lotto. While Lotto is a
good approximation to Blotto in the regime of large n (by law of large numbers), it is a rather poor
approximation in the regime of small n. Nevertheless, analyzing multiplayer Blotto has remained
an open problem for nearly 30 years.
1.1 Our Contributions
We formally define the multiplayer Colonel Blotto game, derive equilibria in several settings of the
game, and provide linear time algorithms to sample from these equilibrium mixed strategies. In
multiplayer Blotto, there are k ≥ 2 players with budgets B1, . . . ,Bk, and, again, each battlefield
is won by whichever player places the highest bid on it. The game serves as a natural model for
several of the famous applications studied in the two-player case, including the electoral competition
application suggested by Myerson.
We focus on the symmetric case of multiplayer Blotto, where all players have the same budget,
and construct efficiently-sampleable symmetric Nash equilibria for various settings of number of
battlefields n and number of players k:
1. We give equilibria for any number of players k whenever the battlefields can be partitioned
into k sets of equal value (Theorem 2.2). Furthermore, we provide an O(n) time algorithm for
sampling the randomized strategy (Algorithm 1).
2. We give equilibria for symmetric three-player Blotto whenever no battlefield accounts for more
than one third of the value of all battlefields (Theorem 2.4). Importantly, we again provide an
O(n) algorithm to compute all these equilibrium strategies, and in fact the distributions are
derived algorithmically. (Algorithm 2).
where  = a1
n−1 , to win all but the first battlefield. This pair of actions is not in equilibrium because Alice can switch
her strategy to that of Bob in order to win half of the total value rather that 1/n of it. Therefore, in general we are
looking for mixed Nash equilibria.
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We also introduce a simple variant of Blotto which we call the Boolean Colonel Blotto game.
Boolean Blotto is the same as normal Blotto except players have integer budgets and their bids on
each battlefield are restricted to be 0 or 1. In other words, players choose which subset of battlefields
to compete on (i.e., bid 1 on). The value of each battlefield is, as in Blotto, split evenly among
the players who bid the most on it. In Section 3 we formally define and analyze this game in the
multiplayer setting, which turns out to be significantly more interesting than the two-player Boolean
setting. We give equilibria for all values of k for Boolean Blotto regardless of battlefield valuations
(Theorem 3.9), and describe a polynomial-time approximation scheme for sampling the strategies
(Algorithm 3).
1.2 Motivation
In the century after its introduction by Borel, the Blotto game has seen a plethora of applications.
Many of these naturally generalize to the multiplayer setting. Some are even more natural to
consider with many players. Here are just a few examples:
Elections: k candidates or parties compete across n winner-take-all districts [30, 26, 25, 28]. k = 2
corresponds to a two-party system, while k ≥ 3 corresponds to a multi-party system. Each
candidate or party must decide how to allocate campaign funds, or candidate time, across
districts. One could also consider individual voters in a single-district election to be battlefields,
as Myerson did in [30].
R&D: k companies have the ability to use their fixed R&D budgets to research and develop n
potential drugs [18, 24]. If the first company to develop the drug will receive the patent and
all the profits for that drug, then this is a Blotto game.
Local Monopolies: k competing companies in the same industry want to become the dominant
player in each of n new local markets. If each market will tend to be dominated by the
company that allocates the most resources to the market (due to network effects, for example)
then this is a Blotto game.
Advertising: k companies compete to advertise a substitute good to n consumers [17]. Each
consumer will probably only purchase one of the substitutes, so each battlefield (consumer) is
indeed winner-take-all.
Ecology: k species in a habitat compete to fill n distinct ecological niches [18]. In this setting, if
each niche can only be filled by one species, we can potentially think of the species as evolving
Blotto strategies through natural selection.
There are also substantial mathematical connections between Blotto and simultaneous all-pay
auctions [31, 32]. It is natural to consider these in the multiplayer setting.
Boolean Blotto, on the other hand, is a good model for any Blotto-type situation where whether
to compete in a battlefield is a binary decision. For example, consider an election—perhaps a local
election, or party primary—in which there are n issues and the k candidates distinguish themselves
by choosing some subset of issues to focus on. Or consider k companies each marketing substitute
products (e.g. medications) by highlighting certain features. Finally, one could consider any setting
in which k people must each decide which of n games of chance to compete in (at no cost). Beyond
its immediate applications, we introduce Boolean Blotto because it is a simple variation of the
standard Blotto game that requires completely different mathematical techniques to analyze.
3
1.3 Proof overview
Proof overview In order to derive the mixed Nash equilibria of Theorems 2.2, 2.4 and 3.9 for
the multiplayer Blotto games, we construct equilibria for the General Lotto version of the game,
and then show a coupling of each player’s bid distributions into a joint distribution that satisfies the
budget constraint. Solving for Lotto equilibria is easier, because it allows us to think of a player’s
bid distributions on different battlefields as independent marginal distributions, rather than as
a n-dimensional joint distribution. General Lotto was solved by Myerson [30] in the symmetric
homogeneous multiplayer setting. We extend his techniques in Sections 2 and 3 in order to derive the
unique symmetric equilibria for the symmetric heterogeneous multiplayer setting and the symmetric
heterogeneous Boolean-valued multiplayer setting.
Following an approach similar to [21], we use our solutions to General Lotto to derive Lemmas 2.8
and 3.8, which are sufficient conditions for Colonel Blotto players to be in an equilibrium. These
sufficient conditions for Blotto equilibria apply in some generality, and may be useful in the future
for extending our Colonel Blotto results. The sufficient conditions reduce solving Colonel Blotto to
the problem of constructing a joint distribution of bids with marginal bid distributions corresponding
to a General Lotto equilibrium, subject to the constraint that the sum of each player’s bids is almost
surely equal to the player’s budget.
For each of our three main theorems, we show the existence of the desired couplings constructively,
by directly giving efficient linear-time algorithms to sample from the coupled distributions. Each
algorithm uses a different technique to couple the given marginal distributions. In order to prove
Theorem 2.2, we use special properties of the Dirichlet distribution. The crux of Theorem 2.4’s
proof involves efficiently transforming a list of battlefield valuations (v1, . . . , vn) into a corresponding
matrix that rotates the 2-sphere about the origin in n-dimensional hyperspace. Interestingly, we show
that sampling from the surface of this rotated sphere and returning the squares of the coordinates
yields a sample from a properly coupled distribution. An interesting characteristic of this proof
method is that the existence of a distribution (that couples the Lotto marginals) is established via
an efficient sampling procedure, in contrast to the typical approach of finding an efficient sampling
procedure for a known distribution. Finally, in order to prove Theorem 3.9, we use a greedy
construction that couples arbitrary Bernoulli random variables subject to a budget constraint.
1.4 Qualitative discussion of theorems
A principal goal of analyzing the Blotto game is to help applied researchers understand the qualitative
differences that arise as the number of players or battlefields changes. We interpret these limiting
behaviors obtained from our derivations here.
For standard multiplayer Blotto (by Theorems 2.2 and 2.4):
1. For a fixed number of players k, as the number of equally-valued battlefields increases, each
player’s bids become more evenly spread out across the battlefields, tending to the uniform
distribution.
2. When the number of players equals the number of battlefields, then the players play much
higher bids on some battlefields than on others.
In the Boolean-valued case (by Theorem 3.9)
1. Each player i places a bid on each battlefield j with some probability pj . As the number
of players k tends to infinity, each equilibrium bid probability pj tends to (vj/V )B, roughly
speaking. (See Remark 3.6.)
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2. Similarly to the continuous-valued case, as the number of players increases, the bid probabilities
become more spread out, in the sense that each player is more likely to compete in less valuable
battlefields. (See Remark 3.7.)
For all three theorems above, we show how to sample efficiently from the joint distribution that
we construct. In this sense, the Nash equilibria that we derive can be efficiently implemented in
practice.
1.5 Prior work
The Colonel Blotto game has been the subject of a considerable body of work over the course of a
century. The game (both the discrete budget and continuous budget variations) was first introduced,
without a general solution, by mile Borel in 1921 [10]. This paper was, notably, the first ever in
the nascent game theory literature to describe the concepts of pure and mixed strategies. Borel
referred to Blotto as among the simplest games “for which the manners of playing form a doubly
infinite continuum.” In 1938, Borel and Ville [11] found equilibria for symmetric homogeneous
three-battlefield Blotto. In a pair of papers in 1950, Gross and Wagner [20, 19] found equilibria
for all n, including for the heterogeneous setting. During the postwar period, there was a sizable
classified military literature on Blotto [9].
In 1981, with applications to financial investment in mind, Bell and Cover introduced what,
in modern terminology, would be called the one-battlefield General Lotto game [8]. Myerson,
apparently independently, described one-battlefield General Lotto in 1993, in the context of political
economy [30]. Myerson’s paper is very relevant to our work because it appears to be the only prior
work that considers generalizing Blotto (or rather, the easier-to-analyze Lotto) to a multiplayer
setting. Myerson considers an infinite family of multiplayer generalizations corresponding to different
voting systems; the natural multiplayer game we consider corresponds in this taxonomy to the
plurality voting system. Myerson derived the unique symmetric Nash equilibria for these multiplayer
General Lotto games; these correspond to the marginals of equilibrium strategies in our setting, as
in Lemma 2.8. Note that Myerson dealt with General Lotto rather than Colonel Blotto precisely
because it is easier to deal with: “The advantage of my simplified formulation is that it will enable
us to go beyond this ‘Colonel Blotto’ literature and get results about more complicated situations
in which more than two candidates are competing.” In our paper, we obtain results in these
complicated situations in the rich regime of Blotto.
The current century has seen a resurgence of interest in the Blotto game [26, 25]. In a landmark
2006 paper, Roberson found equilibria for all n for the homogeneous non-symmetric setting [31]. A
string of recent works has worked towards the still not incomplete goal of characterizing solutions
to Blotto in the heterogeneous non-symmetric setting [33, 23, 36]. Kovenock and Roberson’s paper
[23] includes a survey of progress on this question.
A simultaneous recent line of work has dealt with the discrete version of Colonel Blotto, in
which players’ budgets are composed of indivisible units (i.e., their bids must lie in Z≥0). Our
Boolean Blotto game can be thought of as a restricted version of discrete Blotto in which bids must
lie in {0, 1}. In 2008, Hart solved homogeneous symmetric discrete Blotto, and gave the General
Lotto game its name [21]. In 2012, [16] solved non-symmetric discrete General Lotto. Also in the
discrete setting, Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer introduced a variant of Blotto in which the two
players can value battlefields differently, and identified some pure strategy equilibria for this case
[22]. Many other variations of Blotto have been introduced over the decades in both the continuous
and discrete settings [37, 34, 24, 18].
Several recent papers have given algorithms for variations of the discrete Blotto game, typically
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in time polynomial in n and the size of players’ budgets [1, 7, 5, 6]. Our algorithms, on the other
hand, only depend polylogarithmically on the budget size.
Another side of the Blotto literature applies the Blotto model to various social science settings.
In addition to the early military applications and later political economy and finance applications,
Blotto has also been used to study topics such as U.S. presidential elections [28], terrorism [3],
phishing [13], and advertising [17]. It is closely related to the study of all-pay auctions [4]. Still
another line of work, experimental in nature, tries to determine what strategies people will actually
use in real-life Blotto games—see [15] for a survey.
1.6 Organization of paper
The remainder of the paper contains three sections. Section 2 formally defines and solves cases of
the multiplayer continuous Blotto game, and Section 3 formally defines and solves the multiplayer
Boolean Blotto game. Finally, we end with some remarks and open problems in Section 4.
2 Colonel Blotto equilibria
In this section, we formally define the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games for multiple players,
solve for their equilibria and construct efficient sampling methods for the equilibrium strategies.
The Colonel Blotto equilibria are presented in Theorems 2.2 and Theorem 2.4. We begin by formally
defining the Blotto game.
Definition 2.1. The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game is specified by a tuple(
k ∈ N, n ∈ N, ~B ∈ Rn≥0, ~v ∈ Rn≥0
)
,
where k is the number of players, n is the number of battlefields, Bi is the budget of player i ∈ [k],
and vj is the value of the battlefield j ∈ [n]. We denote the sum total of the battlefield values by
V = ‖~v‖1 =
∑n
j=1 vj.
Each player i ∈ [k] plays a bid vector Ai,∗ = (Ai,1, . . . , Ai,n) ∈ Rn≥0 satisfying the budget constraint
‖Ai,∗‖1 =
∑
j∈[n]
Ai,j ≤ Bi.
Let the bid matrix A = (Ai,j)(i,j)∈[k]×[n] be the matrix whose ith row is Ai,∗. For each i ∈ [k], the
payoff function for player i given the bid matrix A of all players is
Ui(A) :=
∑
j∈[n]
Ui,j(A) :=
∑
j∈[n]
vj ·
(
1(i ∈ arg maxi′∈[k]Ai′,j)
| arg maxi′ Ai′,j |
)
.
In words: each battlefield’s value is split evenly among the players who tied for the highest bid on
that battlefield. The game is called symmetric if all the player budgets are equal, and homogeneous
if all battlefield values are equal.
A result of Dasgupta and Maskin establishes the existence of Nash equilibria for all values of k
and n, and guarantees the existence of symmetric equilibria in the symmetric-budget setting [14].
In this paper we give explicit symmetric equilibria for the symmetric setting. Our first theorem
holds for any number of players, but restricted battlefield values:
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Theorem 2.2. Suppose that in the Colonel Blotto game with equal budgets Bi = 1, we are given a
k-partition pi : [n]→ [k] of the battlefields such that there is equal value on each set of the partition:
∑
l∈pi−1(m)
vl =
1
k
n∑
l=1
vl =
V
k
∀m ∈ [k].
Then if each of the players independently runs Algorithm 1, the players will be in Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, Algorithm 1 runs in O(n) time.
The following important special case of this theorem immediately follows by defining pi(j) := (j
mod k) + 1.
Corollary 2.3. Suppose that in the Colonel Blotto game with equal budgets Bi = 1 there are n = mk
battlefields of equal value vi = V/n, for some m ∈ N. Then Algorithm 1 gives a Nash equilibrium in
O(n) time.
Our second main theorem holds only for three player games (k = 3 case), but allows us to handle
a much wider range of battlefield valuations:
Theorem 2.4. Suppose that in the 3-player Colonel Blotto game with equal budgets Bi = 1, the
valuations satisfy
vj ≤ V
3
, ∀j ∈ [n].
Then if each of the players independently runs Algorithm 2, the players will be in Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, Algorithm 2 runs in O(n) time.
The main difficulty in proving Theorems 2.2 and 2.4 is that the strict budget constraint of the
Blotto game generally means that a given player’s bid distributions on the various battlefields have
to be correlated, so that any sample bid-vector from this joint distribution sums to one. That is, each
player i’s bids must be coupled in some potentially complicated way so that the budget constraint∑n
j=1Ai,j ≤ Bi holds with probability 1 over player i’s mixed strategy. In order to overcome this
difficulty, we follow the meta-approach of [21] and prove both theorems by first analyzing the simpler
General Lotto game. This is a variant of the Colonel Blotto game in which the budget constraints
are relaxed to hold only in expectation over each player’s bids, instead of almost surely:
Definition 2.5. An instance of the General Lotto game is specified by a tuple (k, n, ~B, ~v), as in the
Colonel Blotto game. However, instead of playing a real-valued bid for each battlefield, each player
plays a distribution of bids. For each i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [n], player i plays a distribution Di,j over R≥0
such that the budget constraint is met in expectation:
n∑
j=1
EAi,j∼Di,j [Ai,j ] ≤ Bi.
The payoff function for player i ∈ [k] given the bids of all the players is EAUi(A), where for each
i′ ∈ [k], j′ ∈ [k] the bids Ai′,j′ ∼ Di′,j′ are drawn independently.
Given a Nash equilibrium (Di,j)i∈[k],j∈[n] of the General Lotto problem, our approach will be to
try to convert (Di,j)i,j into a Nash equilibrium of the Colonel Blotto problem. Our objective will be
to construct a random variable A ∈ Rk×n≥0 such that the rows Ai,∗ are independent of each other,
such that Ai,j ∼ Di,j for each i ∈ [k], j ∈ [n], and such that the budget constraint ‖Ai,∗‖1 ≤ Bi
holds for each i ∈ [k] almost surely. These conditions will ensure that A is a mixed Nash equilibrium
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for the Colonel Blotto problem. We realize this program as follows: in Section 2.1, we characterize
symmetric General Lotto equilibria, in Section 2.2 we derive a sufficient condition for symmetric
Colonel Blotto equilibria, and in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we use this sufficient condition to prove
Theorems 2.2 and 2.4.
2.1 General Lotto equilibria
We now construct symmetric multiplayer General Lotto equilibria. Our construction is similar
to Myerson [30], who constructed equilibria for the homogeneous case and proved that they were
unique. Similar arguments to [30] would prove uniqueness of our construction in the heterogeneous
case, but for the sake of brevity we omit these arguments since they are not necessary in order to
obtain sufficient conditions for Colonel Blotto equilibria. First, recall the definition of the Beta
distribution:
Definition 2.6. For any α, β > 0, the Beta(α, β) distribution is the distribution supported on the
interval [0, 1] with PDF proportional to xα−1(1− x)β−1. In particular, if X ∼ Beta(α, 1), then the
CDF is P[X ≤ x] = xα for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 2.7. Consider the (continuous-valued) symmetric multiplayer General Lotto game (k, n, ~B =
~1, ~v) with k ≥ 2 players and equal budgets Bi = 1. Suppose that for each i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [n], player i
plays distribution Di,j = kvjV ·Beta( 1k−1 , 1) on battlefield j. Then the players are in Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For this proof, let X ∼ Beta(1/(k − 1), 1). First, the General Lotto budget constraint is
satisfied for all i ∈ [k]
n∑
j=1
EAi,j∼Di,j [Ai,j ] =
n∑
j=1
kvj
V
E [X] =
n∑
j=1
vj
V
= 1 = Bi.
Now suppose that player k deviates by playing distributions D′k,1, . . . ,D′k,n meeting the General
Lotto budget constraint. For all i ∈ [k − 1], j ∈ [n] let Ai,j ∼ Di,j , and Ak,j ∼ D′k,j be independent
random variables. The expected payoff of player k from battlefield j is
E[Uk,j(A) | Ak,∗] = vj · P[∀i ∈ [k − 1], Ai,j ≤ Ak,j | Ak,j ]
= vj ·
k−1∏
i=1
P[Ai,j ≤ Ak,j | Ak,j ] = vj ·
(
P
[
kvj
V
·X ≤ Ak,j
])k−1
= vj ·min
(
1,
(
V
kvj
·Ak,j
)1/(k−1))k−1
= vj ·min
(
1,
V
kvj
Ak,j
)
≤ V
k
Ak,j ,
where we have used that ties are measure-zero events. Therefore,
E[Uk(A)] =
∑
j∈[n]
E[Uk,j(A)] ≤ V
k
·
∑
j∈[n]
E[Ak,j ] ≤ V
k
The last inequality is the General Lotto budget constraint. By symmetry between the players, if
D′k,j = Dk,j for all j ∈ [n] then this upper bound is achieved: E[Uk(A)] = Vk . So playing according
to Lemma 2.7 is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
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2.2 Sufficient Conditions for Colonel Blotto equilibrium
The General Lotto equilibria of Lemma 2.7 immediately give sufficient conditions for players to be
in Colonel Blotto equilibrium:
Lemma 2.8. Consider the symmetric Colonel Blotto game (k, n, ~B = ~1, ~v). The players are in
equilibrium if each player i ∈ [k] independently bids a random vector of bids Ai,∗ = (Ai,1, . . . , Ai,n)
such that:
(a)
∑n
j=1Ai,j ≤ 1 = Bi. (b) Ai,j ∼ kvjV · Beta(1/(k − 1), 1).
Proof. The budget constraints are met by (a). By linearity of expectation, the utilities only depend
on the marginal distributions of the players’ bids for each battlefield. So, if any player deviates from
the strategy, then by Lemma 2.7 and the fact that any Colonel Blotto strategy is also a General
Lotto strategy, the deviating player’s utility cannot improve.
Therefore, we have reduced the problem of computing Colonel Blotto equilibria to the problem
of coupling Beta-distributed variables so as to satisfy the budget constraint. In the following
two sections, we give computationally efficient constructions of such couplings in order to prove
Theorems 2.2 and 2.4.
Remark 2.9 (Blotto 6= Lotto). The conditions in Lemma 2.8 are not necessary for players to be in
Blotto equilibrium. For example, in the Colonel Blotto game specified by (k = 2, n = 1, ~B = 1, ~v = 1),
Lemma 2.8 would require the distribution 2 · Beta(1, 1), which is equal to Unif[0, 2], to have support
≤ 1 in order to meet condition (a). Clearly this is not the case, so the conditions of Lemma 2.8 are
not satisfied, and yet the Colonel Blotto game still has an equilibrium (in which both players play all
of their budget on the one battlefield).
2.3 Couplings for arbitrary numbers of players (Theorem 2.2)
We now prove Theorem 2.2 using the sufficient condition of Lemma 2.8. We will make use of a
property of the multivariate Beta distribution—also known as the Dirichlet distribution.
Definition 2.10. The Dirichlet distribution Dir(α1, . . . , αm) is the distribution on the (m − 1)-
simplex ∆m−1 with density function f(~x; ~α) ∝
∏m
i=1 x
αi−1
i .
Proposition 2.11 (folklore, e.g. [27]). Let (X1, . . . , Xm) ∼ Dir(α1, . . . , αm). Then
(i) For each i ∈ [m], Xi ∼ Beta
(
αi,
∑
j 6=i αj
)
.
(i)
∑m
i=1Xi = 1 almost surely
Proposition 2.11 implies that the Dirichlet distribution on ∆k−1 with parameters ~α = 1k−1~1
has marginals equal to Beta(1/(k − 1), 1). This leads us to the following algorithm to sample a
symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy for each player in a k-player Blotto game where the battlefields
can be partitioned into k sets of equal value.
Algorithm 1: NashEquilThm2.2: Colonel Blotto Nash Equilibrium for Theorem 2.2
Input: a Colonel Blotto game (k, n, ~B = 1, ~v) and a partition function pi : [n]→ [k] satisfying∑
`∈pi−1(m) v` = V/k for each m ∈ [k].
Output: a sample (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Rn from a mixed equilibrium strategy for a single player.
1 Draw (X1, . . . , Xk) ∼ Dir(1/(k − 1), . . . , 1/(k − 1)).
2 Aj ←
(
kvj
V
)
·Xpi(j) for all j ∈ [n].
3 return (A1, . . . , An)
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Proof of Theorem 2.2. Correctness : The output of Algorithm 1 meets the conditions of Lemma 2.8
and therefore the players are in Nash equilibrium:
(a) Budget constraint:
n∑
j=1
Ai,j =
n∑
j=1
(
kvj
V
)
Xi,pi(j) =
k∑
m=1
Xi,m
 ∑
l∈pi−1(m)
kvl
V
 = k∑
m=1
Xi,m
which is 1 by Proposition 2.11(ii).
(b) Marginal constraint: Ai,j ∼
(
kvj
V
)
· Beta(1/(k − 1), 1) by Proposition 2.11(i).
Running time: we can sample the Dirichlet variable in O(n) time, using the method of [2] to sample
n i.i.d variables Yi ∼ Gamma(1/(k − 1), 1) and letting Xi = Yi∑n
l=1 Yl
for all i ∈ [n].
2.4 Couplings for 3 players (Theorem 2.4)
We prove Theorem 2.4, which vastly improves over Theorem 2.2 (from the previous section) in the
k = 3 case. The proof of this theorem is much more involved, and is inspired by the relationship
between the Dirichlet distribution and the Lp-norm uniform distribution defined in [12].
In particular, [35] proves that given (U1, . . . , Um) drawn from the m-dimensional Lp-norm
uniform distribution, then (|U1|p, . . . , |Um|p) is distributed as Dir(1/p, . . . , 1/p). Therefore, for the
construction of Theorem 2.2, in order to draw (X1, . . . , Xk) from the Dir(1/(k − 1), . . . , 1/(k − 1))
distribution, we could have set (X1, . . . , Xk) = (|U1|k−1, . . . , |Uk|k−1) for (U1, . . . , Uk) drawn from
the Lk−1-norm uniform distribution. The k = 3 case is very special, because the Lk−1 = L2-norm
uniform distribution is the uniform distribution on the unit L2 sphere, and therefore it is rotationally
symmetric. We will take advantage of the rotational symmetry of the uniform distribution on the
L2 sphere in order to handle a much wider range of battlefield valuations in Theorem 2.4 when
k = 3. We summarize this intuition by stating the following remarkable geometric fact:
Proposition 2.12. Let U ∈ R3 be a point drawn uniformly at random from the surface of the unit
sphere
∑3
l=1 U
2
l = 1. Let c ∈ R3. Then the inner product c · U is distributed as
c · U ∼ Unif[−‖c‖, ‖c‖], and so (c · U)2 ∼ ‖c‖2 · Beta(1/2, 1).
Proof. By the rotational symmetry of U , the inner product c‖c‖ · U is equal in distribution to U1.
Since U1 ∼ Unif[−1, 1] (see e.g., Theorem 2.1 of [35]), c ·U ∼ Unif[−‖c‖, ‖c‖] follows. Therefore the
CDF of (c·U)
2
‖c‖2 is P[
(c·U)2
‖c‖2 ≤ a] =
√
a for any a ∈ [0, 1]. This proves that (c·U)2‖c‖2 ∼ Beta(1/2, 1).
The analysis of Algorithm 2, which constructs the equilibrium for Theorem 2.4, will depend on
this proposition. In short, the algorithm samples a vector U ∈ R3 uniformly from the unit sphere
S2 ⊂ R3. It then maps U into Rn with a linear isometry described by a matrix M . Finally, it
outputs the coordinate-wise square of this point. In order to ensure correctness, the algorithm
must use an isometry M that has squared row norms proportional to the battlefield valuations.
Finding such an M is the core technical challenge, and it is accomplished by the helper algorithm
ConstructM, which constructs an M that has the following guarantee (proof deferred):
Claim 2.13. Given values 0 ≤ s1, . . . , sn ≤ 1 and m ∈ Z such that
∑n
j=1 sj = m, the method
ConstructM returns in O(nm) time a matrix M ∈ Rn×m such that MTM = Im and ‖Mj,∗‖2 = sj,
for all j ∈ [n]. (Here Mj,∗ denotes the jth row of M .)
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Algorithm 2: NashEquilThm2.4: Colonel Blotto Nash Equilibrium for Theorem 2.4
Input: The number of battlefields n and the battlefield valuations v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn ≥ 0
such that vj ≤ 13V for all j ∈ [n]. Recall that V =
∑n
k=1 vk.
Output: A bid vector A = (A1, . . . , An)
T ∈ Rn for the n battlefields that is sampled from a
distribution satisfying Lemma 2.8 for the Blotto game G = (3, n, ~1, ~v).
1 Function SampleBid(~v) is
2 Construct M ∈ Rn×3 by running: M ← ConstructM (( 3V ) · ~v;m = 3)
3 Sample U ∈ R3 uniformly at random from the unit `2-sphere S2 = {x | ‖x‖2 = 1}.
4 return Aj ← (Mj,∗ · U)2 for all j ∈ [n].
5 end
Input: Values 0 ≤ s1, s2, . . . , sn ≤ 1 and m ∈ N such that
∑n
j=1 sj = m.
Output: M ∈ Rn×m such that MTM = Im and ‖Mj,∗‖2 = sj , for all j ∈ [n].
6 Function ConstructM(~s,m) is
7 Permute the indices of ~s so that sr ≥ sr′ for each r ∈ [m] and r′ ∈ [n] \ [m].
8 Initialize M ∈ Rn×m as Mi,i = 1 for all i ∈ [m], and 0 everywhere else.
9 j ← 1, l← m+ 1.
10 while j ≤ m and l ≤ n do
11 w1, w2 ← RotatePair(u1 = Mj,∗, u2 = Ml,∗, t1 = sj , t2 = sl).
12 Mj,∗ ← w1. Ml,∗ ← w2.
13 if ‖Mj,∗‖2 = sj then j ← j + 1.
14 if ‖Ml,∗‖2 = sl then l← l + 1.
15 end
16 Undo the row permutation from step 7.
17 return M .
18 end
Input: Vectors u1, u2 ∈ Rm, and targets t1, t2 ∈ R such that ‖u1‖2 ≥ t1 ≥ t2 ≥ ‖u2‖2 and
u1 · u2 = 0.
Output: w1, w2 ∈ Rm that are (i) supported on supp(u1) ∪ supp(u2) such that (ii)
W = ( w1 w2 ) ∈ Rm×2 and U = ( u1 u2 ) ∈ Rm×2 satisfy WW T = UUT , (iii)
‖w1‖2 ≥ t1 ≥ t2 ≥ ‖w2‖2 and (iv) there is k ∈ [2] such that ‖wk‖2 = tk.
19 Function RotatePair(u1, u2, t1, t2) is
20 if ‖u1‖2 = ‖u2‖2 then a← 1, b← 0
21 if ‖u1‖2 − t1 ≥ t2 − ‖u2‖2 then
22 a←
√
‖u1‖2−t2
‖u1‖2−‖u2‖2 , b←
√
1− a2.
23 else
24 a←
√
t1−‖u2‖2
‖u1‖2−‖u2‖2 , b←
√
1− a2.
25 end
26 return w1 = au1 − bu2, w2 = bu1 + au2.
27 end
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Assuming Claim 2.13, we prove the correctness of NashEquilThm2.4:
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Correctness: The inputs to ConstructM in step 2 of Algorithm 2 satisfy
the prerequisites 0 ≤ s1, . . . , sn ≤ 1 and
∑n
j=1 sj = m = 3. Therefore, the matrix M ∈ Rn×3 is
guaranteed to have the following properties by Claim 2.13: MTM = I3 and ‖Mj,∗‖2 = 3vjV for all
j ∈ [n]. So if each player i ∈ [3] bids (Ai,1, . . . , Ai,n) by independently running Algorithm 2 with a
random sphere point Ui ∈ R3, then the sufficient conditions of Lemma 2.8 are met:
(a) Budget constraint:
∑n
j=1Ai,j =
∑n
j=1(Mj,∗ · Ui)2 = ‖MUi‖2 = UTi MTMUi = ‖Ui‖2 = 1,
using MTM = I3 and the fact that Ui is on the unit sphere.
(b) Marginal constraint: Ai,j = (Mj,∗ · Ui)2 ∼ ‖Mj,∗‖2 · Beta(1/2, 1) = 3vjV · Beta(1/2, 1) by
Proposition 2.12 and ‖Mj,∗‖2 = 3vj/V .
Running time: The call to ConstructM with m = 3 in step 2 takes O(n) time by Claim 2.13.
Sampling U ∈ R3 in step 3 takes O(1) time, for example using the algorithm of [29]. And finally
step 4 takes 6n multiplications and additions. So the total running time is O(n).
2.5 Proof of Claim 2.13 (ConstructM correctness)
The algorithm ConstructM greedily updates a matrix M ∈ Rn×m using the helper algorithm
RotatePair until the desired properties of M are achieved. M is initialized to the matrix (Im, 0)
T .
Each application of RotatePair applies a linear rotation transformation to a pair of rows from M
such that at least one of these rows becomes scaled correctly, while the column-orthogonality of M
is maintained. Assuming correctness of the RotatePair subroutine, which is proved in Claim B.1
of the appendix, an invariant argument demonstrates that greedily applying RotatePair works:
Proof of Claim 2.13. Correctness: We analyze the algorithm by proving several invariants on M, j, l.
These hold at step 10.
Invariant 1 : sj ≥ sl.
Invariant 2 : The columns of M are orthonormal. MTM = Im.
Invariant 3 : For all r ∈ {j, . . . ,m} and r′ ∈ {l, . . . , n}, ‖Mr,∗‖2 ≥ sr and ‖Mr′,∗‖2 ≤ sr′ .
Invariant 4 : For all r ∈ {j, . . . ,m} and r′ ∈ {l, . . . , n}, Mr,∗ ·Mr′,∗ = 0.
The invariants clearly hold when the algorithm first reaches step 10. We prove that they are
maintained on each iteration. Let M, j, l be the states of the variables before running an iteration of
the while loop, and M ′, j′, l′ the states of the variables after. If M, j, l respect the invariants, then
the preconditions of RotatePair are met, because ‖Mj,∗‖2 ≥ sj ≥ sl ≥ ‖Ml,∗‖2 by Invariants 1 and
3, and Mj,∗ ·Ml,∗ = 0 by Invariant 4.
Invariant 1 : This follows from the preprocessing in step 7, because j ∈ [m] and l ∈ [n] \ [m].
Invariant 2 : Notice that for all a, b ∈ [m],
((M ′)TM ′)ab =
∑
c∈[n]
M ′caM
′
cb = (M
′
jaM
′
jb +M
′
laM
′
lb −MjaMjb −MlaMlb) + (MTM)ab
So since MTM = Im by Invariant 2, it suffices to show that M
′
jaM
′
jb+M
′
laM
′
lb−MjaMjb−MlaMlb = 0
for all a, b. This is precisely the condition that(
M ′j,∗ M
′
l,∗
) (
M ′j,∗ M
′
l,∗
)T
=
(
Mj,∗ Ml,∗
) (
Mj,∗ Ml,∗
)T
,
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which is guaranteed by item (ii) of RotatePair.
Invariant 3 : Since j and l are the only rows modified from the previous step, and j′ ≥ j, l′ ≥ l,
it suffices to consider rows j and l. For these, item (iii) of RotatePair guarantees that ‖M ′j,∗‖2 ≥ sj
and sl ≥ ‖M ′l,∗‖2.
Invariant 4 : Item (iv) of RotatePair guarantees that at least one of j and l is incremented on
each step. If j′ > j, then the invariant holds, because the vectors M ′r,∗ for r ≥ j′ are supported
on coordinates {r, . . . ,m}, while by item (i) of RotatePair the vectors M ′r′,∗ for r′ ≥ l′ ≥ l are
supported on coordinates {1, . . . , k − 1}. Otherwise, if j′ = j then l′ > l, and the vectors M ′r′,∗ for
r′ ≥ j′ are all 0. So in both cases M ′r,∗ ·M ′r′,∗ = 0 for all r ∈ {i′, . . . ,m} and r′ ∈ {j′, . . . , n}.
Therefore Invariants 1 through 4 are maintained by the algorithm. Notice that the row index
j (respectively, l) is only incremented if ‖Mj,∗‖2 = sj (respectively, ‖Ml,∗‖2 = sl), and after
that the row is no longer modified. So if the algorithm ever exits, then ‖Mr,∗‖2 = sr for all
r ∈ {1, . . . , j− 1}∪ {m+ 1, . . . , l− 1}. Now, if the algorithm exits, then j = m+ 1 and/or l = n+ 1.
If j = m+ 1, we have by Invariant 2
m = trace(MTM) =
∑
r∈[n]
‖Mr,∗‖2 =
∑
r∈[l−1]
sr +
∑
r∈[n]\[l−1]
‖Mr,∗‖2, since j = m+ 1
≤
∑
r∈[n]
sr = m, by Invariant 3.
If there were k ∈ [n]/[j − 1] such that ‖Mk,∗‖2 < sk then the inequality in the last line would be
strict. So we may conclude that ‖Mk,∗‖2 = sk for all k ∈ [n]. Combining this with the knowledge
that MTM = Im by Invariant 2, we have shown that if i ever reaches n + 1, then the output is
correct. Similarly, if j ever reaches m+ 1, we may also argue that the output is correct. So it suffices
to prove that the program terminates. This is true because item (iv) of RotatePair guarantees
that either i or j is incremented on each step, and so the loop terminates after at most n iterations.
Running time: The initialization steps (including the permutation of the rows in steps 7 and 16)
take O(mn) time, and each of the ≤ n iterations of the loop takes O(m) time (because RotatePair
takes O(m) time). So the algorithm runs in O(mn) total time.
3 Boolean-valued Colonel Blotto game
We now turn our focus to analyzing the Boolean Blotto game. In this game, each player i chooses
whether to compete or not compete in up to Bi battlefields, and the values of battlefields are split
evenly among the players who compete in them.
Definition 3.1. The Boolean-valued Colonel Blotto game has the same payoff function as the
continuous-valued Colonel Blotto game, with two additional restrictions:
(integer budget) each player i ∈ [k] has an integer-valued budget Bi ∈ {0, . . . , n}
(Boolean bids) each bid Ai,j is either 0 or 1; we say player i competes in battlefield j if Ai,j = 1.
The game is symmetric if all players have the same budget B.
Definition 3.2. In the Boolean-valued General Lotto game, each player i ∈ [k] plays a vector of
probabilities (pi,1, . . . , pi,n), such that the budget constraint is met in expectation:
∑n
j=1 pi,j ≤ Bi.
The payoff function for player i given the bids of all the players is EAUi(A), where for each
i′ ∈ [k], j′ ∈ [k] the bids Ai′,j′ ∼ Ber(pi′,j′) are drawn independently.
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Lemma 3.3. When there are k = 2 players, it is a maximin pure strategy for player i to compete
only in the Bi battlefields of highest value.
Proof. Regardless of the other player’s strategy, the marginal gain from competing in battlefield j
is vj/2, so it is optimal to compete in the most valuable battlefields.
Boolean Blotto only becomes interesting when k > 2. We now proceed to characterize the
equilibria of symmetric multiplayer Boolean Blotto.
3.1 Boolean General Lotto and sufficient conditions for Colonel Blotto
As in our analysis of continuous-valued Colonel Blotto, we first characterize the symmetric equilibria
of the General Lotto analogue of the game.
For a given player, Alice, and given battlefield of value v, let u1(p, v) be the expected utility
earned by Alice from competing in the battlefield if all the other k − 1 players independently
compete with probability p, and let u0(p, v) be Alice’s expected utility from not competing. Let
mv(p) = u1(p, v) − u0(p, v) be the marginal utility of competing. We can write Alice’s expected
utility from competing with probability q as qu1 + (1− q)u0.
If Alice doesn’t compete in the battlefield, she only gains utility when nobody competes:
u0(p, v) =
v
k (1 − p)k−1. The total utility earned by all players from the battlefield is v, so by
symmetry, p · u1(p, v) + (1− p) · u0(p, v) = vk . Combining these two equations yields
mv(p) =
{
v
k (k − 1), p = 0
v
k · 1−(1−p)
k−1
p , 0 < p ≤ 1
We will show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. The probabilities p1, . . . , pk of the
equilibrium strategy are such that the marginal utilities of competing are essentially the same for
all battlefields. This means that if all players including Alice play the equilibrium strategy, then
Alice will have no incentive to move  probability mass from one battlefield to another. To obtain
these probabilities it will be useful to define an inverse of mv(p).
Claim 3.4. When k > 2, mv(p) is continuous and monotonically decreasing on the interval p ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore it maps [0, 1] bijectively to [v/k, (k − 1) · v/k].
The proof is in Appendix C. By Claim 3.4, the inverse m−1v is uniquely defined on [v/k, (k−1)·v/k],
and we may extend its domain to R by letting m−1v (x) = 1 for x < v/k and m−1v (x) = 0 for
x > (k − 1) · v/k. We are now ready to characterize the symmetric General Lotto equilibrium:
Lemma 3.5. The following is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the Boolean-valued General
Lotto game with k ≥ 3 players, equal integer-valued budgets Bi = B and battlefield valuations
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn > 0:
pj = m
−1
vj (x
∗) ∀j ∈ [n] (1)
where x∗ = inf
{
x ∈ R : ∑nj=1m−1vj (x) ≤ B}.
Proof. If B = n, then x∗ = −∞ so every pj = 1; this is clearly the unique equilibrium. So, we
assume that B < n henceforth. Note that we chose x∗ such that the players meet their Lotto budget
constraint exactly.
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Now suppose Alice deviates from the strategy by playing {qj}j∈n while all other players play
{pj}j∈n. The utility she gains by deviating is
n∑
j=1
(qj − pj) ·mvj (pj) =
n∑
j=1
(qj − pj) ·mvj (m−1vj (x∗)) (2)
≤
n∑
j=1
(qj − pj)x∗ = x∗
 n∑
j=1
qj −
n∑
j=1
pj
 (3)
= x∗(B − B) = 0 (4)
where the inequality in line 3 arises because x∗ may lie in the extended domain of m−1vj for some js.
Thus, Alice has no incentive to deviate, so this is an equilibrium.
Now we prove uniqueness. Let {pij}j∈n be any symmetric equilibrium. We will show that there
must exist an x′ such that pij = m−1vj (x
′) for each j. Assume for contradiction that
There is no x′ such that pij = m−1vj (x
′) for each j.
We will show in cases that there are battlefields i and ` such that: (a) the marginal utility
mvi(pii) < mv`(pi`), and (b) probability pii > 0 and probability pi` < 1. Thus, a player Alice will
increase her utility by shifting  probability mass from battlefield i to `.
Case 1 Suppose pii ∈ (0, 1) for some i. Let x′ = mvi(pii). Assumption (*) implies that there is
some ` ∈ [n] such that pi` 6= m−1v` (x′) > 0. Three subcases ensue: (a) if pi` = 0, then 0 < m−1v` (x′),
so applying the monotonically decreasing function mv` to both sides of the inequality yields
mv`(pi`) = mv`(0) > x
′ = mvi(pii). (b) if pi` = 1, then 1 > m−1v` (x
′), so applying the monotonically
decreasing function mv` to both sides of the inequality yields mv`(pi`) = mv`(1) < x
′ = mvi(pii). (c)
if pi` ∈ (0, 1), then either mv`(pi`) > mvi(pii) or mv`(pi`) < mvi(pii).
Case 2 Suppose pij ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ [n], yet there is no x′ such that x′ = mvj (pij) for all
j ∈ [n]. Then there must be indices i, ` ∈ [n] such that pii = 1 and pi` = 0 and vi < (k − 1)v` so
mvi(pii) = mvi(1) =
vi
k <
k−1
k v` = mv`(0) = mv`(pi`).
In all cases, moving  probability mass from the battlefield with the smaller marginal utility to
the larger (between i and j) strictly increases Alice’s utility and shows the (pi1, . . . , pin) is not an
equilibrium. Since we know there is an x′ such that pij = m−1vj (x
′) for each j, it is an immediate
consequence of the tightness of the budget constraint that it must be x∗, thereby completing the
proof.
Remark 3.6 (Limit of large k). In order to understand the asymptotic behavior of the solution
as the number of players k tends to infinity and the average utility per player stays constant (so
we increase the values vj proportionally with k). Notice that mk·vj (p) tends towards vj/p for each
j, so the inverse m−1vj ·k(x) tends towards min(1, vj/x) for x > 0. Therefore, in the limit of large k,
the equilibrium strategy tends towards surely competing in some of the top-valued battlefields and
competing in the rest with probabilities proportional to the values of those battlefields. Quantitatively,
Lemma 3.5 prescribes this strategy: iteratively assign portions of the budget to battlefields 1, . . . , n in
order of decreasing value as follows. Write B(l) to denote the budget remaining after assigning budget
to battlefields 1, . . . , l, and let B(0) = B. Then battlefield l is assigned budget min(1,B(l−1) vl∑n
j=l vj
).
So roughly speaking we assign to each battlefield a fraction of the budget equal to the fraction of the
total value that the battlefield represents.
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Remark 3.7 (Qualitative change in strategy as k increases). We also qualitatively observe that as
the number of players increases, the players are more likely to bid on battlefields of low value.
As an example, consider two battlefields with values given by v1 = 1 and v2 > 0 and k players
with budget given by B = 1. Then (i) if k ≤ 1/v2 + 1, we will have p1 = 1 and p2 = 0, meaning that
if there are not enough players then no one will compete in the battlefield with small value. On the
other hand, (ii) if k > 1/v2 + 1, then we prove in Appendix C that p2 > 0, meaning that if there are
enough players then they will compete in the low-value battlefield with some non-zero probability.
As in the continuous-valued case, the General Lotto solutions in Lemma 3.5 yield sufficient
conditions for the players to be in Nash equilibrium:
Lemma 3.8. Let k ≥ 3. Suppose that in the symmetric Boolean-valued k-player Colonel Blotto
game with battlefield valuations v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn > 0 and equal integer-valued budgets Bi = B,
each player i ∈ [k] independently bids a vector Ai,∗ = (Ai,1, . . . , Ai,n) such that for each i ∈ [k]:
(a)
∑n
j=1Ai,j ≤ B.
(b) Ai,j ∼ Ber(pj), where pj is given in the statement of Lemma 3.5, using budget B.
Then the players are in equilibrium. Furthermore, this is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
The proof (in Appendix C) is by linearity of expectation, as in the real-valued setting.
3.2 Colonel Blotto equilibria
We now show how to obtain an efficient Colonel Blotto strategy from the equilibrium General
Lotto strategy. This consists of two tasks: (1) efficiently estimating the implicitly described
pj ’s, and (2) efficiently computing a coupling of allocations that has the approximate pj ’s as its
marginals. The first task, estimation, can be performed with a carefully tuned binary search. The
second task presents an appealing puzzle: given n Bernoulli random variables with biases pi, . . . , pn
satisfying
∑n
i=1 pi = B ∈ Z≥0, how can they be coupled into a joint distribution such that draws
x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1} from the distribution satisfy
∑n
i=1 xi = B almost surely? Algorithm 3 is a very
simple procedure for solving this puzzle.
Algorithm 3: NashEquilThm3.9: Boolean-valued Blotto equilibrium for Theorem 3.9
Input: A symmetric Boolean Blotto game (k, n,B, ~v) with battlefield valuations
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn > 0.
Output: A sample (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Rn from the equilibrium mixed strategy for a single player
in the Boolean-valued Blotto game (k, n,B, ~v).
1 For each j ∈ [n], let pj be as defined in Lemma 3.5 or Theorem 3.9.
2 For each j ∈ [n], let αj =
∑j−1
j′=1 pj′
3 Draw β ∼ Unif[0, 1]
4 For each j ∈ [n], let Aj = 1[∃m ∈ Z | β +m ∈ [αj , αj + pj)]
5 return (A1, . . . , An)
Theorem 3.9. Suppose that in the Boolean-valued Colonel Blotto game with equal budgets Bi = B
and k > 2 players, each player i ∈ [k] independently runs Algorithm 3. Then all of the players will
be in Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, given parameter  > 0, Algorithm 3 runs in time polynomial in the problem size and
log(1/), and produces an -approximate Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. We verify that the sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium from Lemma 3.8 are met.
We can assume without loss of generality that B ≤ n, because otherwise all players compete in al
battlefields, which is a Nash equilibrium. So in this case
∑n
j=1 pj = B ∈ Z≥0.
An equivalent way of applying the sampling procedure is to set
Aj = 1[{β +m}m∈Z ∩ [αj , αj + pj) 6= ∅].
Note that the intervals [αj , αj +pj) constitute a partition of the interval [0,B), and that {β+m}m∈Z
intersects this long interval B times, and finally that {β+m}m∈Z intersects each interval [αj , αj +pj)
at most once. It follows that, for any β, exactly B of the Aj bids are set to 1. This proves that
the budget constraint holds almost surely. And probability Aj is set to 1 is pj because the interval
[αj , αi + pj) has length pj . So all the sufficient conditions of Lemma 3.8 are met.
Efficient approximation of equilibrium We have constructed an exact Nash equilibrium.
However, our algorithm is not yet efficient, because we have not yet described how to compute the
probabilities pj . These are defined implicitly in the statement of Lemma 3.5, but there appears to
be no closed form. Nevertheless, if we could approximately compute the pj probabilities, then we
could approximate the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the utility for a player can range from 0 to V and
there are k players, so in order to compute an -Nash equilibrium it suffices to approximate the
equilibrium strategy for each player up to (/kV ) error in statistical total variation. Since there
are n probabilities pj , this can be achieved by approximating each pj up to additive error (/kV n).
We want this estimation error even after scaling the approximate pj ’s so their sum is B; for this it
suffices to achieve additive error (/kV n2). We explain how to do with this with a carefully tuned
binary search in Appendix C.
4 Remarks & Open Problems
In this paper, we extended the definition of the Colonel Blotto problem to the multiplayer setting,
and also introduced the study of the Boolean version of the problem. We solved for the unique
symmetric Lotto equilibria and coupled the marginals to construct Blotto equilibria in the symmetric
case of these games under various parameter regimes of number of players, number of battlefields,
and values of battlefields In all cases, we characterized the symmetric equilibria of the General
Lotto version of the game and coupled the resulting bid distributions into a constrained joint
distribution to solve the Blotto version. A highlight of our paper is the efficient sampling algorithm
for the symmetric three player case of continuous Blotto—Algorithm 2—which is built from the
geometric intuition of rotating a 2-sphere about the origin in hyperspace. Interestingly, this result
proves the existence of a coupling satisfying the sufficient constraints of Lemma 2.8 by directly
giving an algorithm to sample such a coupled distribution. It is an open question whether the
existence of the coupling can be proved in a more direct way. This leads to our most general open
question of characterizing when marginal distributions D1, . . . ,Dn over R can be coupled into a
joint distribution D over Rn such that a certain budget constraint holds almost surely in D. The
decision problem is weakly NP-hard even in the case of finitely-supported discrete distributions (by
a simple reduction from Subset-Sum). It is an alluring problem to obtain a deeper understanding
of the cases in which a budget-constrained coupling exists and can be constructed efficiently.
In Section 2, we gave Algorithm 1 for efficiently sampling equilibrium strategies in the Blotto
game for arbitrarily large numbers of players, as long as battlefields satisfied a value-partitioning
constraint. A special case captured by Corollary 2.3 is when all battlefields have equal value and the
number of battlefields is a multiple of the number of players. An important case left open therefore
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is solving for equilibria when the number of battlefields is arbitrary and there are four or more
players. A construction handling this case would complete the picture for symmetric homogeneous
multiplayer Colonel Blotto.
In Section 3, we solved the multiplayer Boolean Blotto problem, where each player could play
either a 0 or a 1 at each battlefield. Of course, the generalization of this problem which allows
players to make integer (not just Boolean) bids—discrete multiplayer Blotto—is a natural open
problem.
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A Informal derivation of General Lotto solution
Let us informally describe how we arrive at the General Lotto equilibria in Lemma 2.7, assuming
for simplicity that we are in the homogeneous setting considered by Myerson [30], so the battlefields
have value 1. We are looking for an equilibrium that exploits the symmetry of the game across
players and across battlefields. It is natural to guess that this can be achieved by all k players
playing the same single-variable distribution of bids on each of the n battlefields. Denote the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of this distribution by F .
In order to derive F , we guess that F has no atoms and is supported in a finite interval [0, θ].
Then we consider what happens once players 1, . . . , k − 1 have fixed their General Lotto strategies
to playing F on all n battlefields. Suppose that player k deviates and plays distributions G1, . . . , Gn
on the n battlefields. Since F has no atoms, a tie between the players is a measure-zero event, so the
utility derived by player k on battlefield j is P[Ak,j > maxi∈[k−1]Ai,j ], where A1,j , . . . , Ak−1,j ∼ F
and Ak,j ∼ Gj are independent. Hence player k’s payoff on battlefield j depends only on their bid
relative to the maximum bid value Mj = maxi∈[k−1]Ai,j of all the other players.
Now, if Mj is not uniform over [0, θ] for some θ, then player k can strictly gain over the other
players by playing a slight perturbation F˜ of the distribution F , where  probability mass is moved
from values of x where P[M < x]/x is lower to values of x where P[M < x]/x is higher. Therefore,
if the players are in equilibrium, P[Mj < x] = (F (x))k−1 = min(1, xθ ), which implies that for all
i ∈ [k − 1] we have
F (x) = min
(
1, (x/θ)
1
k−1
)
.
One can solve for the scaling parameter θ by requiring that the budget constraint be tightly enforced:∑n
j=1 E[Ai,j ] = 1 for any i ∈ [k−1]. We note that F is a scaling of the Beta(1/(k−1), 1) distribution.
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B RotatePair correctness
Claim B.1. RotatePair is correct and runs in O(m) time.
Proof. If ‖u1‖2 = ‖u2‖2, then we must also have ‖u1‖2 = t1 = t2 = ‖u2‖2, so returning (w1, w2)←
(u1, u2) is correct. Otherwise, items (i)-(iv) still hold:
(i) supp(w1) ∪ supp(w2) ⊆ supp(u1) ∪ supp(u2) since w1, w2 are a linear combination of u1, u2.
(ii) W = ( w1 w2 ) ∈ Rm×2 and U = ( u1 u2 ) ∈ Rm×2 are related by W = U
(
a b
−b a
)
,
so
WW T = U
(
a b
−b a
)(
a −b
b a
)
UT = U
(
a2 + b2 0
0 a2 + b2
)
UT = UUT ,
since a2 + b2 = 1.
(iii and iv) There are two cases to consider. Note that since u1 · u2 = 0, we have ‖w1‖2 =
a2‖u1‖2 + b2‖u2‖2 and ‖w2‖2 = b2‖u1‖2 + a2‖u2‖2:
• If ‖u1‖2 − t1 ≥ t2 − ‖u2‖2, then
‖w1‖2 = (‖u1‖
2 − t2)‖u1‖2
‖u1‖2 − ‖u2‖2 +
(t2 − ‖u2‖2)‖u2‖2
‖u1‖2 − ‖u2‖2 = ‖u1‖
2 + ‖u2‖2 − t2 ≥ t1
‖w2‖2 = (t2 − ‖u2‖
2)‖u1‖2
‖u1‖2 − ‖u2‖2 +
(‖u1‖2 − t2)‖u2‖2
‖u1‖2 − ‖u2‖2 = t2.
• If ‖u1‖2 − t1 < t2 − ‖u2‖2, then
‖w1‖2 = (t1 − ‖u2‖
2)‖u1‖2
‖u1‖2 − ‖u2‖2 +
(‖u1‖2 − t1)‖u2‖2
‖u1‖2 − ‖u2‖2 = t1
‖w2‖2 = (‖u1‖
2 − t1)‖u1‖2
‖u1‖2 − ‖u2‖2 +
(t1 − ‖u2‖2)‖u2‖2
‖u1‖2 − ‖u2‖2 = ‖u1‖
2 + ‖u2‖2 − t1 ≥ t2.
And in both cases conditions (iii) and (iv) hold.
The running time is O(m), because we just compute the norms of two vectors of size m and
output a linear combination of the vectors.
C Boolean Blotto Lemma Proofs
For ease of presentation, we define:
µ(p) =
{
k − 1, p = 0
1−(1−p)k−1
p , 0 < p ≤ 1
Thus, mv(p) =
v
kµ(p). The domain of µ
−1 is extended by letting µ−1(x) = 1 for x < 1 and
µ−1(x) = 0 for x > k − 1.
Proof of Claim 3.4. By l’Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
p→0+
µ(p) = lim
p→0+
(k − 1)(1− p)k−2
1
= k − 1 = µ(0),
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proving continuity. And for any p ∈ (0, 1),
∂µ
∂p
=
p(k − 1)(1− p)k−2 − 1− (1− p)k−1
p2
=
(1− p)k−2(1 + p(k − 2))− 1
p2
< 0,
because for t = k − 2 > 0 we have (1 − p)−t ≥ (1 + pt). This holds because (1 − p)−t|p=0 = 1 =
(1 + pt)|p=0 and ∂∂t(1− p)−t = t(1− p)−t−1 ≥ t = ∂∂t(1 + pt) for p ∈ [0, 1].
The bijectivity follows from continuity and monotonicity.
Proof of Lemma 3.8. The budget constraints are met by (a). If any player deviates from the strategy,
then, by the analysis of Lemma 3.5, the player’s expected payoff cannot improve. This is because
by linearity of expectation the expected payoff for Colonel Blotto only depends on the marginal
distributions of the bids for the battlefields.
Proof of Remark 3.7. Part (i) follows because Bk(1) =
∑2
j=1 µ
−1(1/vj) ≥ µ−1(1) = 1, so x∗ ≥ 1, so
p2 = µ
−1(x∗/v2) ≤ µ−1(k−1) = 0. To prove part (ii) consider x = (k−1)v2, which satisfies x > 1 by
the condition on the number of players. It follows that Bk(x) = µ
−1(x) + µ−1(x/v2) = µ−1(x) < 1.
By continuity of Bk(x), there is  > 0 such that Bk(x − ) ≤ 1, and therefore x∗ < x. Hence
p2 = µ
−1(x∗/v2) > µ−1(k − 1) = 0.
C.1 Approximation procedure for Algorithm 3
1. First, given any x ∈ R we show how to compute an additive ′ approximation p˜ to p = µ−1(x)
in poly(log k, log(1/′)) operations. If x ≤ 1 or x ≥ k − 1, then p˜ = 1 or p˜ = k − 1 are respectively
correct. Otherwise, for the case 1 < x < k− 1, recall from Claim 3.4 that µ maps [0, 1] bijectively to
[1, k − 1], and is continuous and monotonically decreasing. Therefore we can binary search to find
p˜ such that |p˜− p| < ′. This binary search requires only O(log(1/′)) evaluations of µ, and each
evaluation of µ up to ˜′ precision costs only poly(log k, log(1/˜′)) operations. We can set the precision
parameter to ˜′ = ′/2, because for any p′, p′′ ∈ [0, 1], we have |µ(p′) − µ(p′′)| ≥ |p′ − p′′|, since
d
dpµ(p
′) ≤ −1 for all p′ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore the total cost of the binary search is poly(log k, log(1/′)).
2. Second, we show how to compute x˜ such that |x˜−x∗| < ′′, in poly(n, log k, log(V/′′)) operations.
Recall the definition x∗ = inf{x ∈ R : Bk(x) ≤ B}, where Bk(x) =
∑n
j=1 µ
−1(x/vj). We will use
the fact that Bk(x) is monotonically non-increasing and continuous. By the proof of Lemma 3.8, in
the nontrivial case B < n it holds that x∗ ∈ [0, (k − 1)V ]. Hence we can binary search to find x˜
such that |x˜− x∗| < ′′. The binary search requires O(log(kV/′′)) evaluations of Bk(x). Using part
(1) each evaluation of Bk up to precision ˜
′′ costs poly(n, log k, log(n/˜′′)) operations, by separately
evaluating each term up to precision ˜′′/n. We now investigate the necessary precision ˜′′. At any
point in the binary search when we query point xˆ one of two cases arises:
• Case A: For each x′ between xˆ and x∗, there is a j(x′) ∈ [n] such that µ−1(x′/vj(x′)) ∈ (0, 1).
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In this case, for all x′ between xˆ and x∗,
dBk(x)
dx
|x=x′ = d
dx
n∑
l=1
µ−1(x/vl)|x=x′ (5)
≤ d
dx
µ−1(x/vj(x′))|x=x′ (6)
≤ − 2
(k2 − 3k + 2)vj(x′)
(7)
≤ − 1
V k2
(8)
So |Bk(x) − B| = |Bk(x) − Bk(x∗)| ≥ |xˆ − x∗|/(V k2), and so if |xˆ − x∗| > ′′/2 it suffices to
compute Bk(x) up to accuracy ˜
′′ = ′′/(2V k2) in order to determine whether xˆ ≤ x∗ or xˆ > x∗.
• Case B: Otherwise there is x′ between xˆ and x∗ such that µ−1(x′/vj) ∈ {0, 1} for all j. In
this case, if xˆ ≤ x∗ then our approximation B˜(xˆ) to Bk(xˆ) satisfies B˜(xˆ) ≥ |{j : µ−1(xˆ/vj) =
1}| ≥ |{j : µ−1(x′/vj) = 1}| = Bk(x′) ≥ Bk(x∗). And by a similar argument B˜(xˆ) > Bk(x∗) if
Bk(xˆ) > Bk(x
∗); and B˜(xˆ) ≤ Bk(x∗) if Bk(xˆ) ≤ Bk(x∗); and B˜(xˆ) < Bk(x∗) if Bk(xˆ) < Bk(x∗).
Therefore we can set the precision parameter to ˜′′ = ′′/(2V k2). So the total cost of the binary
search is poly(n, log k, log(V/′′)).
3. Third, suppose we have x˜ such that |x˜−x∗| < ′′. Then for each j ∈ [n] we define p˜j = µ−1(x˜/vj).
By a simple calculation, µ−1(x) is 1-Lipschitz over R, so we are guaranteed that |p˜j − pj | ≤
′′/vj ≤ ′′/vn. Letting ′′ = (vn/V kn2)/2 and computing x˜ with the procedure from (2), and
approximating p˜j up to 
′ = (/V kn2)/2 error with the procedure from (1), we obtain an overall
(/V kn2) approximation to pj . The total running time is poly(n, log k, log(V/), log(V/vn)), which
is polynomial in the input size of the problem.
4. Finally, given approximations p˜j to the true pj probabilities, the sampling procedure takes time
and space linear in n and the number of bits of precision in the p˜j probabilities. This is polynomial
in the problem size and log(1/).
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